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A dynamical systems model of unorganised segregation in
two neighbourhoods
D. J. Haw and S. J. Hogan*
Abstract
We present a complete analysis of the Schelling dynamical system [5] of two connected neighbourhoods, with or
without population reservoirs, for different types of linear and nonlinear tolerance schedules.
We show that stable integration is only possible when the minority is small and combined tolerance is large.
Unlike the case of the single neighbourhood, limiting one population does not necessarily produce stable integration
and may destroy it.
We conclude that a growing minority can only remain integrated if the majority increases its own tolerance. Our
results show that an integrated single neighbourhood may not remain so when a connecting neighbourhood is created.
1 Introduction
Segregation in society takes on many forms, occurring not only in ethnicity or religion, but also gender, for
example amongst toddlers [10] and in professional hierarchies [1]. Segregation is seen as so divisive that
some have argued it “puts the whole idea of a peaceful society with its constitutional and civic liberties at
risk." (cited in [11, p.4]), with €1.1B allocated to integration efforts by the Netherlands in 2003 (cited in [11,
p.4]).
Schelling‘s seminal work on segregation [12, 13] is well known for its use of agent-based modelling
to explain unorganised1 segregation. These papers have been cited thousands of times and inspired
innumerable other works. They are also the subject of controversy in terms of precedence [6] and
applicability [2].
What appears less well known is that, in the same two papers, Schelling introduced another model, the
bounded neighbourhood model (BNM) of unorganised segregation. In Schelling‘s BNM, a neighbourhood
is like a district within a city. Within the neighbourhood, every member is concerned about the overall
population mixture, not with any particular configuration. A member moves out if they are not happy with
the population mixture.
Suppose that the population of a single neighbourhood is divided into two types and let X(t), Y(t) ≥ 0
represent the respective population sizes, as a function of time t. In this neighbourhood, tolerance limits
are allocated to a given population type via a tolerance schedule, as follows2. The X-population tolerance
schedule RX(X) describes the minimum ratio Y/X required in order for all of the X-population to remain
in that neighbourhood. A similar function RY(Y) denotes the tolerance schedule of the Y-population.
Schelling [12, 13] made the following assumptions:
S1. The neighbourhood is preferred over other locations: populations of either type will enter/remain/leave
unless tolerance conditions are violated.
*D. J. Haw, School of Public Health, Imperial College London. S. J. Hogan: Department of Engineering Mathematics, University of
Bristol, Bristol BS8 1UB
1The modern usage would be self-organised.
2Tolerance is a measure of how members of one population remain in an area where there is another population present. In contrast,
homophily (or self-segregation) [1] is a measure of how much one population seeks out members of the same population.
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S2. The tolerance schedule is neighbourhood-specific.
S3. Each member of the population is aware of the ratio of population types within the neighbourhood at
the moment the decision is made to enter/remain/leave (perfect information).
S4. There is no lower bound on tolerance: no population insists on the presence of the other type.
S5. Tolerance schedules are monotone decreasing: the more tolerant population members are the first to
enter and the last to leave.
We gave the first dynamical systems formulation of Schelling’s BNM in [5]. This work studies the
continuous movement of two populations in and out of a single neighbourhood. We presented the first
complete quantitative analysis of the model for linear tolerance schedules. A fully predictive model was
derived and each term within the model was associated with a social meaning. Schelling‘s qualitative
results were recovered and generalised.
For the case of unlimited population movement, we derived exact formulae for regions in parameter
space where stable integrated populations can occur and showed how neighbourhood tipping can be explained
in terms of basins of attraction. When population numbers are limited, we derived exact criteria for the
occurrence of integrated populations.
A natural extension of [5] is to consider multiple neighbourhoods, constructing sets of differential
equations that describe the flow of population within and between these neighbourhoods. In this paper,
we focus on the case of two populations X(t), Y(t) moving within and between two neighbourhoods. Our
work is related to the "two-room model" of segregation studied in [15, 16]. Our approach differs in that we
work in continuous time, whereas they work in discrete time.
We structure the paper as follows. In Section 2, we consider the situation in which both populations
are contained solely within the two neighbourhoods, so that any population leaving one neighbourhood
must necessarily relocate to the other. We consider linear tolerance schedules, examining cases when the
tolerance schedules are the same or different in both neighbourhoods.
We examine the case when one population has its numbers limited in one area (Section 3), and look at
how nonlinearity in the tolerance schedules can change outcomes (Section 4).
We discuss our results in Section 5. We consider the situation where there are reservoirs of both
populations, outside the two neighbourhoods. Whilst the total population of each type in the whole
system is conserved, populations can enter or exit either neighbourhood without recourse to the other
neighbourhood. We also examine similarities between the one- and the two-neighbourhood problems and
consider what happens when a second neighbourhood is added to the single neighbourhood problem.
Our conclusions are presented in Section 6.
2 Linear tolerance schedules
Recall that for one neighbourhood with two populations X, Y, where population members can come and
go depending on their tolerance, the dynamical system derived in [5, Eq. (27)] is given by
dX
dt
= X[XRX(X)−Y], (1)
dY
dt
= Y[YRY(Y)−X]
for general tolerance schedules RX(X), RY(Y). This model satisfies the constraints on the X-population that
dX
dt ≷ 0 when RX(X) ≷ YX : in other words, the X-population grows (decays) when the tolerance schedule
RX(X) exceeds (falls short of) Y/X and that dXdt = 0 when X = 0. The model satisfies similar constraints on
the Y-population. Schelling’s initial example of a tolerance schedule is linear, as shown in Figure 1. We set
RX(X) = a(1−X), (2)
RY(Y) = b(1− kY),
where we scale the size of the X-population to 1 and the minority Y-population to 1/k, where k ≥ 1. With
our scalings, the most tolerant member of the X-population can abide a YX ratio of a > 0 and the least
tolerant member of the X-population can not abide any members of the Y-population. Likewise, the most
tolerant member of the Y-population can abide a XY ratio of b > 0 and the least tolerant member of the
Y-population can not abide any members of the X-population.
Figure 1: Linear tolerance schedules RX(X), RY(Y), as defined in (2).
In the one-neighbourhood problem, it is assumed that outside the neighbourhood, there is a “place where
colour does not matter" [13]. Population members can move between this place and the neighbourhood.
We now consider the case of two neighbourhoods and two populations, where any population leaving
one neighbourhood must necessarily enter the other. Let (Xi, Yi), i = 1, 2 denote the (X, Y)-populations in
neighbourhood i. So X1 +X2 = Xtotal and Y1 +Y2 = Ytotal where Xtotal , Ytotal are both constant. As above, we
scale populations such that Xtotal = 1 and Ytotal = 1k . Hence
X2 = 1−X1, (3)
Y2 = 1k −Y1. (4)
If the neighbourhoods were completely independent of one another, then (Xi, Yi), i = 1, 2 would
separately satisfy (1). But the population dynamics in one neighbourhood is affected by movement of
population to and from the other neighbourhood. So we have to take that into account in our modelling.
To do this we make the additional mild assumption that each member in both neighbourhoods only cares
about the population mixture of the neighbourhood that they are in.
Let us consider neighbourhood 1. The dynamics is governed by the following equations.
dX1
dt
= X1[X1RX1(X1)−Y1]−X2[X2RX2(X2)−Y2] (5)
dY1
dt
= Y1[Y1RY1(Y1)−X1]−Y2[Y2RY2(Y2)−X2] (6)
The first two terms on the right hand side of (5) are the same as those in (1) and correspond to the
movement of X-population, subject to the presence of the Y-population, in and out of neighbourhood 1.
The third and fourth terms account for the movement of the X-population, subject to the presence of the
Y-population, in and out of neighbourhood 2. The terms on the right hand side of (6) can be considered in
an analogous way.
For linear tolerance schedules (2) in both neighbourhoods, for i = 1, 2 we set
RXi(Xi) = ai(1−Xi), (7)
RYi(Yi) = bi(1− kYi).
where a1 ≠ a2, b1 ≠ b2 in general. From (3) and (4), the dynamics in neighbourhood 2 is given simply by
dX2
dt
= −dX1
dt
, (8)
dY2
dt
= −dY1
dt
. (9)
So we have no need to consider these dynamics explicitly, since they can be obtained directly from the
dynamics of neighbourhood 1.
Substituting (3), (4) into (5) and (6), with linear tolerance schedules (7), we obtain the following equations
for (X1, Y1):
dX1
dt
= a1X21(1−X1)−X1Y1 − a2X1(1−X1)2 + (1−X1)(1k −Y1), (10)
dY1
dt
= b1Y21 (1− kY1)−X1Y1 − kb2Y1(1k −Y1)2 + (1−X1)(1k −Y1).
Note that the coordinate axes X1 = 0, Y1 = 0 are no longer nullclines of the full system (unlike in [5]).
We can reduce the ensuing algebraic complexity by performing an additional scaling. Define new
variables tˆ, Yˆ1 given by
tˆ = t
k
, Yˆ1 = Y1a1 (11)
and then set
α = ka1, β1 = a1b1, β2 = a1b2, γ = a2a1 . (12)
Now we drop the hats and simplify (10) to find:
dX1
dt
= (1−X1)[1− αγX1 + α(1+ γ)X21]− αY1, (13)
a1
dY1
dt
= (1− αY1)[1− β2Y1 + α(β1 + β2)Y21 ]−X1.
Equilibria (steady states) in neighbourhood 1 are given by (X1, Y1) = (Xe1, Ye1) where dXe1dt = dYe1dt = 0. If
both Xe1 ≠ 0 and Ye1 ≠ 0, these equilibria correspond to integration. We find (Xe1, Ye1) by considering the
intersection in (X1, Y1)-space of the nullclines of (13), namely solutions of
αY1 = (1−X1)[1− αγX1 + α(1+ γ)X21], (14)
X1 = (1− αY1)[1− β2Y1 + α(β1 + β2)Y21 ]. (15)
We will establish conditions under which real positive solutions of (14) and (15) can exist. Then we will
find further conditions under which such solutions are stable.
2.1 Case I
We consider the case when the (X, Y)-population linear tolerance schedules are identical in both neigh-
bourhoods. So in (7), we set
a1 = a2 = a, b1 = b2 = b,
Hence from (12) we have
α = ka, β1 = β2 = β, γ = 1. (16)
Parameters α and β are key to what follows. With scaling (11), both refer to the minority Y-population:
large/small α corresponds to a small/large minority and large/small β refers to a tolerant/intolerant
minority. From (13), the governing equations become
dX1
dt
= (1−X1)[1− αX1 + 2αX21]− αY1, (17)
a1
dY1
dt
= (1− αY1)[1− βY1 + 2αβY21 ]−X1
Our aim is to find how many possible equilibria (Xe1, Ye1) exist and then to examine their stability. The
points (Xe1, Ye1) correspond to the intersection of the nullclines
αY1 = (1−X1)[1− αX1 + 2αX21], (18)
X1 = (1− αY1)[1− βY1 + 2αβY21 ]. (19)
Substitution of (18) into (19) gives an equation of the form
p9(X1) = 0,
where p9(X1) is a real polynomial of degree 9 in X1. So there are at most 9 equilibria of (17).
By inspection, we have (Xe1, Ye1) = (1, 0), (0, 1α), ( 12 , 12α) for any values of the parameters α, β. These
solutions correspond to:(Xe1, Ye1) = (1, 0): all the X-population and none of the Y-population in neighbourhood 1; none of the
X-population and all the Y-population in neighbourhood 2.
(Xe1, Ye1) = (0, 1α): none of the X-population and all the Y-population in neighbourhood 1; all the X-
population and none of the Y-population in neighbourhood 2.
(Xe1, Ye1) = ( 12 , 12α): both X, Y-populations evenly split between neighbourhoods 1 and 2.
So we can write
p9(X1) = X1(1−X1)(1− 2X1)p6(X1) (20)
where
p6(X1) ≡ 6∑
i=0 aiXi1 (21)
is a real polynomial of degree 6. It can be shown that p6(X1) = p6(X2) = p6(1−X1), from (3). This gives
a5 = −3a6, a3 = 5a6 − 2a4, a1 = −3a6 + a4 − a2 and so the odd coefficients of p6(X1) can be written in terms of
the even coefficients. We find that
a0 = α + β + β
α
(22)
a1 = −3β(α + 2)
a2 = β(2α2 + 15α + 6)
a3 = −12αβ(α + 2)
a4 = 2αβ(13α + 6)
a5 = −24α2β
a6 = 8α2β.
Since both α, β > 0, the signs of ai in p6(X1) alternate. Hence by Descartes’ rule of signs, p6(X1) can
have 0, 2, 4 or 6 positive real roots (X1 = Xe1 > 0), depending on parameter values, and no negative real roots.
By the symmetry of p6(X1), any roots Xe1 ∈ [0, 1]. Hence p9(X1) can have 3, 5, 7 or 9 positive real roots, no
negative real roots and any roots must lie in the interval [0, 1].
Note that we could have chosen to eliminate X1 from (18) and (19) to give a ninth order polynomial
q9(Y1) in Y1. Similar considerations would then apply to the roots of q9(Y1) with any roots Ye1 ∈ [0, 1α ].
We show examples of three qualitatively different cases in figure 2 for (α, β) = (9, 16), (9, 40), (9, 80). On
the left hand side, we show the nullclines (18), (19) in (X1, Y1)-space for each case. We colour the basins of
attraction in our plots according to the stable equilibrium which it contains3. On the right hand side of
figure 2, we plot the corresponding p6(X1).
Figure 2a shows the case when α = 9, β = 16. Here p9(X1) has only three real roots corresponding to(Xe1, Ye1) = (1, 0), (0, 1α), ( 12 , 12α). The basin of attraction of (Xe1, Ye1) = (0, 1α) is shown in pink and the basin of
attraction of (Xe1, Ye1) = (1, 0) is shown in blue. The equilibrium (Xe1, Ye1) = ( 12 , 12α) has no basin of attraction.
Figure 2b shows that the corresponding p6(X1) has no real zeros.
In Figure 2c, we take α = 9, β = 40. Now nullclines (18), (19) have five intersections, corresponding to
five real roots of p9(X1). Three of these roots correspond to (Xe1, Ye1) = (1, 0), (0, 1α), ( 12 , 12α), as before. So
the two new roots correspond to zeros of p6(X1). Figure 2d shows that p6(X1) has indeed developed two
zeros. Neither of these two new equilibria has a basin of attraction4.
In Figure 2e, we take α = 9, β = 80. Nullclines (18), (19) have nine intersections, corresponding to nine
real roots of p9(X1) and p6(X1) has six zeros, seen in figure 2f. Two of these six roots correspond to
integrated populations with a basin of attraction, shown in white in figure 2e.
In this case, there is no example of p9(X1) having seven roots, corresponding to p6(X1) having four
zeros.
From a societal perspective, figure 2 paints a rather gloomy picture. Figures 2a and 2c both imply that
populations will be segregated at these values of (α, β), since both figures show only basins of attraction
of segregated populations. The central (integrated) equilibrium (Xe1, Ye1) = ( 12 , 12α) never has a basin of
attraction and so appears unstable. Stable integration seems possible only in figure 2e, corresponding to
a small, highly tolerant, minority. As in the single-neighbourhood case [5], tipping points of the system
correspond to the boundaries of the basins of attraction.
We will now establish exact criteria for the existence and stability of roots of p9(X1) as (α, β) vary.
2.1.1 Existence of equilibria of (17)
Since we always have roots Xe1 = 0, 12 , 1 of p9(X1), we need only consider the existence of roots of p6(X1).
From the right hand side of figure 2, there will be at least two real roots of p6(X1) when
p6(12) < 0.
Since p6( 12) = α2 − 12αβ + β, then p6( 12) < 0 implies that
β > βc ≡ 2α2
α − 2 . (23)
Since β > 0, we must have α > 2. At β = βc, the two nullclines (18), (19) have a cubic tangency. Note the
minimum value of βc = 16, which occurs when α = 4. The next step is to observe that if X1 = 12 + η is a root
of p6(X1) = 0, then by symmetry, so too is X1 = 12 − η, where η ∈ [0, 12 ]. So we have two equations for η:
6∑
i=0 ai(12 ± η)i = 0, (24)
3In fact, the colour scheme is based on the index of dissimilarity [9] evaluated at the corresponding stable equilibrium state; see
section 5.
4Note that the central equilibrium (Xe1, Ye1) = ( 12 , 12α ) has changed its character from a saddle in figure 2a to an unstable node in
figure 2c. We discuss the nature of these equilibria in section 2.1.2 below
(a) α = 9, β = 16: (X1, Y1) phase space (b) α = 9, β = 16: p6(X1) vs X1
(c) α = 9, β = 40: (X1, Y1) phase space (d) α = 9, β = 40: p6(X1) vs X1
(e) α = 9, β = 80: (X1, Y1) phase space (f) α = 9, β = 80: p6(X1) vs X1
Figure 2: Three qualitatively different possibilities for Case I. In the left hand figures, nullcline (18) is shown in blue and nullcline
(19) is shown in red. The pink region is the basin of attraction of the equilibrium (Xe1, Ye1) = (0, 1α ) and the blue region
is the basin of attraction of (Xe1, Ye1) = (1, 0). The white regions in figure 2e correspond to the basin of attraction of two
of the new equilibria in that figure. Stable nodes are denoted by  , unstable nodes by # and saddle points by ⊗. The
right hand figures show p6(X1) in each case.
where ai, i = 0 . . . 6 are given in (22). We now expand both equations in (24), and add to give
Aη6 + Bη4 +Cη2 +D = 0 (25)
where
A = 8α2β, (26)
B = 4αβ(3− α), (27)
C = 1
2
β(α2 − 6α + 12), (28)
D = α − β
2
+ β
α
. (29)
So η2 has either one or three real values, depending on the sign of the discriminant ∆ ≡ B2C2 − 4AC3 −
4B3D − 27A2D2 + 18ABCD, because (25) is a cubic in η2. Hence p6(X1) will have either two real roots or
six real roots; it can not have four real roots. Hence p9(X1) = 0 can not have seven roots (the missing
case from figure 2). Note that this is not in contradiction of Descartes rule of signs, which is a necessary
condition only. Note that when D = 0, we have β = βc and (25) has solution η2 = 0. Hence p6( 12) = 0, which
corresponds exactly to (23).
A lengthy calculation shows that
∆ = −4α5β2 [8α2β + α(432− 72β − β2)+ 8β2] . (30)
Hence ∆ = 0 when β = β± where
β± ≡ 48− α [9α − α2 ±√α(α − 6)3] . (31)
So η2 has three real values, and η has six real values, for β ∈ [β−, β+]. At β = β±, the two nullclines (18),
(19) have quadratic tangencies. We must have α ≥ 6 for real values of β±.
The existence of equilibria of (17) is summarised in figure 3. Solid lines correspond to β = βc ≡ 2α2/(α−2),
from (23) and β = β± ≡ 48−α [9α − α2 ±√α(α − 6)3], from (31). The apex of the dark shaded region is the
point P2 = (α, β) = (6, 36). Since integrated equilibria occur only inside this region, we can deduce that this
version of the two-room problem requires a very tolerant (large β), small (large α) minority to produce an
integrated population (which may or may not be stable).
The above analysis also allows us to obtain an exact expansion of p6(X1) as a cubic in (X1 − 12). Since
η = ±(X1 − 12), we have from (24) and (25) that
p6(X1) = 6∑
i=0 aiXi1 (32)= A(X1 − 12)6 + B(X1 − 12)4 +C(X1 − 12)2 +D. (33)
So
p9(X1) = X1(1−X1)(1− 2X1)⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣8α2β(X1 − 12)
6 + 4αβ(3− α)(X1 − 12)4
+ 1
2
β(α2 − 6α + 12)(X1 − 12)2 + (α − β2 + βα )
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦. (34)
Hence we can give exact expressions for all the roots X1 = Xe1 of p9(X1) = 0. We already have Xe1 = 0, 12 , 1.
Now we can solve p6(Xe1) = 0 for (Xe1 − 12)2 from (34) using the standard formula for roots of a cubic, take
the square root and obtain Xe1 and then use (18) to obtain the corresponding value of Y
e
1 . These unwieldy
expressions, not given here, can then be used to check the numerical results in figure 2.
Figure 3: Number of equilibria of (17), corresponding to the roots of p9(X1). Solid lines correspond to β = βc ≡ 2α2/(α − 2),
from (23) and β = β± ≡ 48−α [9α − α2 ±√α(α − 6)3], from (31). Integrated equilibria occur only inside the dark shaded
region, for β ∈ [β−, β+], when (17) has nine equilibria. The polynomial p9(X1) has five roots in the light shaded region
and only three roots in the white shaded region. In both these cases, only segregated equilibria are possible. The apex P2
of the dark shaded region is the point (α, β) = (6, 36).
2.1.2 Stability of equilibria of (17)
It is clear from figure 2 that not all equilbria of (17) are stable, since they have no basin of attraction. In this
section, we determine stability criteria for equilibria of (17). Let us write (17) in the form
dX1
dt
= P(X1, Y1), (35)
a1
dY1
dt
= Q(X1, Y1).
where
P(X1, Y1) = (1−X1)[1− αX1 + 2αX21]− αY1, (36)
Q(X1, Y1) = (1− αY1)[1− βY1 + 2αβY21 ]−X1.
To establish stability criteria, we must calculate the eigenvalues of the Jacobian of (35), given by
J(X1, Y1) ≡ ⎛⎝ ∂P∂X1 ∂P∂Y1∂Q∂X1 ∂Q∂Y1
⎞⎠ = ( −(1+ α)+ 6αX1(1−X1) −α−1 −(α + β)+ 6αβY1(1− αY1) ) , (37)
evaluated at the various equilibria (X1, Y1) = (Xe1, Ye1).
For the equilibrium (Xe1, Ye1) = (1, 0), the eigenvalues of J(X1, Y1) are given by
λ± = 12 [−(1+ 2α + β)±√4α + (1− β)2] . (38)
It is straightforward to show that both λ± < 0 for all α > 0, β > 0. Hence the equilibrium (Xe1, Ye1) = (1, 0),
corresponding to all of the X-population in neighbourhood 1 and all of the Y-population in neighbourhood
2, is a stable node, shown by a solid circle ( ) in figure 2. Unless the system is modified in some way,
this means that there will always be a non-empty set of initial conditions that will lead to this segregated
outcome.
For the equilibrium (Xe1, Ye1) = (0, 1α), the eigenvalues are also given by (38). Similar considerations
apply to this (stable) segregated outcome.
The equilibrium (Xe1, Ye1) = ( 12 , 12α) has a more subtle behaviour. Its eigenvalues are given by
λ± = 14 [β − (α + 2)±√(β + 2)2 + 9α2 + 4α − 6αβ] . (39)
We can show that λ+ > 0 in (39). Hence the equilibrium is always unstable. In addition, λ− ≷ 0 for
β ≷ βc where βc ≡ 2α2/(α − 2), from (23). Hence (Xe1, Ye1) = ( 12 , 12α) is a saddle for β < βc, shown by a crossed
circle (⊗) in figure 2, and an unstable node for β > βc, shown by an open circle (#). At β = βc, we have a
supercritical pitchfork bifurcation, where the saddle at (Xe1, Ye1) = ( 12 , 12α) becomes an unstable node and
two saddles. This explains why no new stable equilibria are created at β = βc. This bifurcation occurs
precisely at the boundary between three and five equilibria shown in figure 3.
The three equilibria considered so far are zeros of p9(X1); they always exist for any values of α, β. The
remaining zeros of p9(X1) come from p6(X1). They can be found analytically, as explained above. But the
expressions for the equilibria are unwieldy and the ensuing stability calculations are extremely lengthy. So
we will simply summarise the results.
In figure 4a, we set α = 1.9 and plot the resulting values of Xe1 as a function of β (the values of Ye1 are
omitted, for convenience). Since α < 2, none of the quantities βc, β± is defined and p9(X1) only has three
real zeros: Xe1 = 0, 1 (both stable nodes, shown in green) and Xe! = 12 (a saddle, shown in black).
In figure 4b, we take α = 5. Since 2 < α < 6, we have βc = 503 ≈ 16.67, with β± undefined. The saddle
existing for β < βc becomes an unstable node (shown in red) and the new solutions for β > βc are saddles.
In figure 4c, we set α = 7.1. Hence βc ≈ 19.77 and β− ≈ 46.29, β+ ≈ 73.62. The pitchfork bifurcation at
β = βc is followed by fold bifurcations at β = β±. For β ∈ [β−, β+], we see two stable nodes, corresponding to
stable integration. These two solution branches have different basins of attraction (see figure 2e).
Finally in figure 4d, α = 10 and now the pitchfork bifurcation is at β = βc = 25. We can always find an
integrated population whenever β > β− ≈ 70.60.
So to get a stable integration in two neighbourhoods with the same linear tolerance schedules, we need
to select parameters (α, β) to lie in the dark shaded region of figure 3, corresponding to a small, highly
tolerant, minority. For 6 < α < 8, we can only find an integrated solution when β− < β < β+. For α > 8, we can
always find an integrated population whenever β > β−, provided we start with the right initial conditions.
2.2 Case II, III and IV
In the previous section, the linear tolerance schedules (7) were the same in both neighbourhoods (γ = 1,
β1 = β2) for both majority X- and minority Y-populations. Let us now consider the case in which the linear
tolerance schedules are different. The types of people remain the same, but the two neighbourhoods induce
a different tolerance in each population (this may be due to other factors such as urban environment,
educational provision, etc). We revert to the original dynamical system (13) and nullclines (14) and (15).
We distinguish three different cases:
Case II; γ = 1, β1 ≠ β2: the majority population have the same tolerance in both neighbourhoods; the
minority have different tolerances in both neighbourhoods.
Case III; γ ≠ 1, β1 = β2: the majority population have different tolerances in both neighbourhoods; the
minority have the same tolerance in both neighbourhoods.
Case IV; γ ≠ 1, β1 ≠ β2: both populations have different tolerances in both neighbourhoods.
(a) α = 1.9: βc, β± undefined. (b) α = 5, βc = 503 ≈ 16.67: β± undefined.
(c) α = 7.1: βc ≈ 19.77 and β− ≈ 46.29, β+ ≈ 73.62. (d) α = 10: βc = 25 and β− ≈ 70.60.
Figure 4: Case I: equilibrium values Xe1 as a function of β for (a) α = 1.9, (b) α = 5, (c) α = 7.1 and (d) α = 10.
Substituting (14) into (15), we obtain a ninth order polynomial p˜9(X1) of possible equilibria. We know
that Xe1 = 0, 1, by inspection of (14), (15). But Xe1 = 12 is no longer a guaranteed equilibrium. Hence we write
p˜9(X1) = X1(1−X1)p˜7(X1),
where
p˜7(X1) ≡ 7∑
i=0 biXi1. (40)
The real coefficients bi are given by
b0 = −(α + β1)γ − β1
α
(41)
b1 = (1+ 1
α
)β1 + α(1+ γ)+ β2
α
+ (5β1 + 2β2)γ + α(2β1 + β2)γ2
b2 = −2(2β1 + β2)− [(7+ 4α)β1 + (5+ 2α)β2]γ − 3α(3β1 + 2β2)γ2 − α2(β1 + β2)γ3
b3 = (3+ 2α)β1 + (3+ α)β2 + [(3+ 14α)β1 + (3+ 10α)β2]γ + [3α(5+ α)β1 + 3α(4+ α)β2]γ2 + 5α2(β1 + β2)γ3
b4 = −α(5β1 + 4β2)− α[(16+ 3α)β1 + (14+ 3α)β2]γ − α[(11+ 12α)β1 + (10+ 12α)β2]γ2 − 10α2(β1 + β2)γ3
b5 = α(β1 + β2)[3+ α + 3(2+ 3α)γ + 3(1+ 6α)γ2 + 10αγ3]
b6 = −α2(β1 + β2)(2+ 9γ + 12γ2 + 5γ3)
b7 = α2(β1 + β2)(1+ γ)3
Note that p˜7(X1) evaluated at γ = 1, β1 = β2 can be shown to equal (1− 2X1)p6(X1), as expected.
2.2.1 Equilibria
Equilibria of the governing equations (13), segregated or integrated, correspond to real zeros of p˜9(X1).
We know by inspection that Xe = 0, 1 are equilibria. But owing to the lack of symmetry between the two
neighbourhoods, we can say very little analytically about any other equilibria, corresponding to real zeros
of p˜7(X1) in (40).
The signs of the coefficients bi of p˜7(X1) alternate for allowed values of the parameters. So Descartes’
rule of signs tells us that p˜7(X1) has 1,3,5 or 7 real roots for X1 > 0 and no real roots for X1 < 0. Hence
p˜9(X1) has 3,5,7 or 9 real roots for X1 > 0 and no real roots for X1 < 0, as in case I.
We can also show that there has to be at least one real root of p˜7(X1) for X1 ∈ (0, 1), for any allowed
parameter values. Simple calculation shows that p˜7(0) = −(α + β1)γ − β1α < 0 and p˜7(1) = (α + β2)+ β2α > 0.
Since p˜7(X1) is continuous in X1, the Intermediate Value Theorem tells us that there always has to be at
least one zero of p˜7(X1) between X1 = 0 and X1 = 1. Since neither p˜7(1) nor p˜7(0) is identically zero, the
root must lie strictly between X1 = 0 and X1 = 1.
Governing equations (13) can be written in the form
dX1
dt
= K(X1, Y1), (42)
a1
dY1
dt
= L(X1, Y1).
where
K(X1, Y1) = (1−X1)[1− αγX1 + α(1+ γ)X21]− αY1, (43)
L(X1, Y1) = (1− αY1)[1− β2Y1 + α(β1 + β2)Y21 ]−X1.
The Jacobian of (42) is given by
J(X1, Y1) ≡ ⎛⎝ ∂K∂X1 ∂K∂Y1∂L∂X1 ∂L∂Y1 ⎞⎠= ( −(1+ αγ)+ 2α(1+ 2γ)X1 − 3α(1+ γ)X21 −α−1 −(α + β2)+ 2α(β1 + 2β2)Y1 − 3α2(β1 + β2)Y21 ) ) . (44)
For the equilibrium (Xe1, Ye1) = (1, 0), the eigenvalues of J(X1, Y1) are given by
λ± = 12 [−(1+ 2α + β2)±√4α + (1− β2)2] . (45)
Both λ± < 0 and are independent of β1. Hence (Xe1, Ye1) = (1, 0) is always a stable node. When γ = 1, β1 =
β2 = β, (45) reduces to (38).
For the equilibrium (Xe1, Ye1) = (0, 1α), the eigenvalues of J(X1, Y1) are given by
λ± = 12 [−(1+ β1)− α(1+ γ)±√α2(γ − 1)2 + (β1 − 1)2 + 2α[(γ + 1)+ β1(1− γ)]] . (46)
These eigenvalues are both negative for all allowed values of α, β and are independent of β2. Hence(Xe1, Ye1) = (0, 1α) is always a stable node. Equation (46) reduce to (38) when γ = 1, β1 = β2 = β.
Our considerations above show that there is always at least one other equilibrium of (42) in addition
to (Xe1, Ye1) = (1, 0), (0, 1α). In the case when there is exactly one additional equilibrium, the fact that both(Xe1, Ye1) = (1, 0), (0, 1α) are always stable nodes means that this third equilibrium must be a saddle.
In general, owing to the lack of symmetry, further equilibria must be created by fold bifurcations. These
happen when turning points of p˜7(X1) (locally quadratic maxima or minima) cross the X1 axis. We do not
expect pitchfork bifurcations in case II, III or IV, which occur in systems with an inversion or reflection
symmetry [4], for example case I.
Fold bifurcations produce either a stable node (a desirable outcome because Xe1 ≠ 0 and Ye1 ≠ 0) and a
new saddle or an unstable node and a new saddle. We then face the following possibilities: (i) further
equilibria (stable or unstable) can be produced by additional new fold bifurcations, (ii) the original saddle
can disappear in a fold bifurcation with the newly created node or (iii) the original fold bifurcation can be
reversed.
Finally in this section, we show some bifurcation diagrams to illustrate the wealth of possible behaviour
that can occur. For case II, γ = 1, β1 ≠ β2, we take α = 9, β1 = 40 and vary β2, shown in figure 5a. The phase
space diagram for β2 = 56 is shown in figure 5b. For case III, γ ≠ 1, β1 = β2, we take γ = 2, β1 = β2 = 60 and
vary α, shown in figure 5c. The phase space diagram for α = 6.5 is shown in figure 5d. Finally for case IV,
γ ≠ 1, β1 ≠ β2, we take γ = 2, β1 = 80, β2 = 40 and vary α, as shown in figure 5e. Note the presence of a
transcritical bifurcation near α = 1.5, which arises due to local symmetry. The phase space diagram for
α = 1.5 is shown in figure 5f.
3 Limiting numbers
For the case of a single neighbourhood, when parameters α, β are such that only segregation is possible,
Schelling [12, 13] proposed that an integrated population could be obtained by limiting numbers of one
or both populations. In [5], we gave exact conditions under which this could occur. We also analysed the
stability of the resulting equilibria and showed that the removal of the most intolerant individuals can lead
to integration for most values of α, β. For some parameter values, it is possible to create up to seven new
equilibria. But there are some values of α, β where limitation of the population can not produce integration.
In this section, we consider how limiting numbers might affect the population mixture for two neighbour-
hoods in case I (cases II, III and IV can be treated similarly). The picture is considerably more complicated
than the one neighbourhood case. There are at least two ways to limit the population when there is more
than one neighbourhood. We can restrict the overall number of one population. So for example, we could
take X1 +X2 = u for u ∈ (0, 1). This is equivalent to the solution proposed by Schelling [12, 13] in the case of
one neighbourhood. Note that this is not the same as a simple rescaling the X-population, since the least
tolerant member of the X-population can now abide a YX ratio of (1− u) ≠ 0.
Another way to restrict population when there is more than one neighbourhood is to impose a limit in
one neighbourhood only, for example X1 = u < 1, but keep the overall population unchanged. Consequently
in this case X2 ∈ [1− u, 1], since X1 +X2 = 1 from (3). This way of limiting population is different to that
treated by Schelling [12, 13] and [5], so we will analyse it here.
Let us begin by restricting the X1-population (and hence the X2-population), as illustrated in figure 6.
The Y-population is not restricted. Integration will correspond to intersections of the line X1 = u with the
cubic nullcline (19) given by X1 = (1 − αY1)[1 − βY1 + 2αβY21 ]. In figure 6, we show the case β ∈ [2α, 8α],
when nullcline (19) has a middle branch, which lies completely within the feasible (X1, Y1) phase plane.
In the absence of any population restriction, there will be three integrated equilibria, given by (X1, Y1) =(Xe1, Ye1) = (Xa1, Ya1 ), (Xc1, Yc1), (Xb1, Yb1 ).
The turning points (X±1 , Y±1 ) of nullcline (19) are important. If the X-population is restricted at X1 = u,
we exclude the most intolerant people. But for u ∈ [X+1 , 1), we do not gain any extra equilibrium. Instead the
segregated equilbrium at (X1, Y1) = (0, 1) becomes the (slightly) integrated equilbrium (X1, Y1) = (u, Yul1 ).
Figure 6 shows the case when the upper unrestricted equilibrium Ya1 > Y+1 with u ∈ [Xa1, X+1 ]. There
are three new equilbria, denoted by (X1, Y1) = (u, Yul1 ), (u, Yum1 ), (u, Yuu1 ) on the lower, middle and upper
branches, respectively, where Y1 = Yu(l,m,u)1 are the real roots of the cubic equation
u = (1− αY1)[1− βY1 + 2αβY21 ] (47)
(a) Case II: γ = 1, β1 ≠ β2; α = 9, β1 = 40. (b) Case II with α = 9, β1 = 40, β2 = 56.
(c) Case III: γ ≠ 1, β1 = β2; γ = 2, β1 = β2 = 60. (d) Case III with γ = 2, β1 = β2 = 60, α = 6.5.
(e) Case IV: γ ≠ 1, β1 ≠ β2; γ = 2, β1 = 80, β2 = 40. (f) Case IV with γ = 2, β1 = 80, β2 = 40, α = 1.5.
Figure 5: Bifurcation diagrams and example phase portraits for case II, III and IV. Stable equilibria are denoted by  , unstable
nodes by # and saddle points by ⊗.
when the discriminant of (47) is positive. Note that if Ya1 < Y+1 , we can only get two new equilibria if
u ∈ [Xa1, X+1 ] (not shown).
So to proceed we must first find out when the turning points (X±1 , Y±1 ) of nullcline (19) exist. Then
since the case Ya1 = Y+1 (and hence by symmetry5 Yb1 = Y−1 ) separates different types of behaviour, we must
5In cases II, III and IV, there will be two different intersections, due to the lack of symmetry.
Figure 6: Limiting the X1 population: X1 = u: β ∈ [2α, 8α] , Ya1 > Y+1 .
investigate when the two nullclines (18), (19) intersect there.
Turning points (X±1 , Y±1 ) of nullcline (19) exist when it has a vertical tangent. From (19), we find
dY1
dX1
= 1[−(α + β)+ 6αβY1 − 6α2βY21 ] . (48)
It is straightforward to show that, when β > 2α, the nullcline (19) has vertical tangents at
(X±1 , Y±1 ) = (12 ± 118αβ√3β(β − 2α)3, 12α ± 16αβ√3β(β − 2α)) . (49)
When β ∈ [2α, 8α], these vertical tangents lie within the feasible (X1, Y1)-plane. When β = 2α, the two
nullclines (18), (19), have a cubic tangency at the central equilibrium (X1, Y1) = (Xc1, Yc1) = (X+1 , Y+1 ) =(X−1 , Y−1 ) = ( 12 , 12α).
Let us now investigate ways in which equilibria can occur on the middle branch of nullcline (19), when
β ∈ [2α, 8α]. Our aim is to find a curve Γu(α, β) = 0 that separates regions where three integrated equilibria
are possible from regions where two integrated equilibria are possible. Points on this curve must satisfy:
X±1 ≡ 12 ± 118αβ√3β(β − 2α)3 = u, (50)
αY±1 ≡ 12 ± 16β√3β(β − 2α) = (1− u)(1− αu + 2αu2). (51)
Equation (50) is the statement that the lines X1 = u and X2 = 1− u intersect, due to symmetry, the vertical
tangents of nullcline (19). Equation (51) is the statement that points (u, Y±1 ) lie on nullcline (19).
Substituting (50) into (51), it can be shown that
Γu(α, β) ≡ β3 − 9αβ2 + 6α(α + 9)β + 16α3. (52)
Figure 7: Limiting the X1-population. Γu(α, β) = 0 (equation (52), shown by black dashed line); β = βc (equation (23), shown in
red); β = β± (equation (31), shown in green), together with the lines α = 2, α = 8 and β = 2α, β = 8α.
The curve Γu(α, β) = 0 is shown by the black dashed line in figure 7. Note that it is asymptotic to β = βc
and β = β−, as α → ∞. Also shown in the same figure are β = βc (equation (23), shown in red); β = β±
(equation (31), shown in green), together with the lines α = 2, α = 8 and β = 2α, β = 8α (shown in blue). We
can see that the (α, β) parameter space is then divided up into 19 regions (some of which are extremely
small). In each of these regions, the effect of restricting the X1-population is slightly different. We shall
discuss below the behaviour in two of these regions.
Let us now consider the case when we limit the Y1-population (and hence the Y2-population), but not
the X-population. New integrated equilibria will correspond to intersections of the line Y1 = v with the
cubic nullcline (18), given by solutions Y1 = Yv1 of αY1 = (1−X1)[1− αX1 + 2αX21] (not shown). In a similar
manner to above, it can be shown that turning points6 (X±1 , Y±1 ) are given by
(X±1 , Y±1 ) = (12 ± 16α√3α(α − 2), 12α ± 118α2 √3α(α − 2)3) , (53)
which exist whenever α > 2. When α = 2, the two nullclines (18), (19), have a cubic tangency at the central
equilibrium (X1, Y1) = (Xc1, Yc1) = (X+1 , Y+1 ) = (X−1 , Y−1 ) = ( 12 , 12α). It can be shown that the middle branch of
nullcline (19) exists wholly with the permitted phase plane region when α ∈ [2, 8].
Our aim is to find a curve Γv(α, β) = 0 in the (α, β) plane that separates regions where three integrated
equilibria are possible from regions where two integrated equilibria are possible. Points on this curve must
satisfy:
Y±1 ≡ 12 ± 118α2 √3α(α − 2)3 = v, (54)
X±1 ≡ 12 ± 16α√3α(α − 2) = (1− αv)(1− βv + 2αβv2). (55)
Equation (54) is the statement that the line Y1 = v intersects both horizontal tangents of nullcline (18).
Equation (55) is the statement that points (X±1 , v) lie on nullcline (18).
6We retain the same notation for these turning points. No confusion should arise.
It can be shown that
Γv(α, β) ≡ β − 54α2(8− α)(α − 2)(α + 1) . (56)
We do not show the curve Γv(α, β) = 0 in figure 7. It is asymptotic to both the lines α = 2, 8.
The effect of restricting the Y1-population can be seen in (α, β) parameter space, by replacing the curve
Γu(α, β) = 0 by Γv(α, β) = 0 in figure 7. The effect of restricting both the X1- and Y1-populations can be seen
by adding the curve Γv(α, β) = 0 to figure 7.
Both Γu,v(α, β) = 0 have a minimum at the same value of β. The minimum of Γu occurs at the point(αu, β) ≈ (3.798, 21.488), where nullcline (15) passes through both the maximum and minimum of nullcline
(14). Similarly, the minimum of Γv occurs at the point (αv, β) ≈ (5.658, 21.488), where nullcline (14) passes
through both the maximum and minimum of nullcline (15).
So far in this section, we have only considered the existence of new equilibria when a population is
limited. Let us now consider the stability of these new solutions. When the X1-population is restricted to
X1 = u, the dynamics on this line is governed by the second equation in each of (42) and (43):
a1
dY1
dt
= L(u, Y1) = (1− αY1)[1− βY1 + 2αβY21 ]− u. (57)
The equilibrium Y1 = Yu1 of (57) is the solution of (47). There are either one or three real values of Yu1 ,
depending on whether the line X1 = u crosses the nullcline once or three times. Stability is governed by the
eigenvalue
λu = −(α + β)+ 6αβYu1 − 6α2β(Yu1 )2.
Analytical progress can be made in finding λu, but in general it has to be evaluated numerically. System
(57) can never undergo a Hopf bifurcation to a periodic solution since it is only one-dimensional. Similar
conclusions apply when the Y1-population is restricted to Y1 = v. The dynamics on this line are governed
by the first equation in each of (42) and (43):
dX1
dt
= K(X1, v) = (1−X1)[1− αX1 + 2αX21]− αv, (58)
and the stability of the equilibrium X1 = Xv1 is governed by the eigenvalue
λv − (1+ α)+ 6αXv1 − 6α(Xv1)2,
which can be evaluated numerically.
We demonstrate the effects of restricting the X1-population in two different areas of (α, β) parameter
space shown in figure 7. First we take (α, β) = (6, 30), so we are in the light shaded region of figure 3.
When u = 1, shown in figure 8a, we have no restriction on population. We have 5 equilibria: two stable
segregated equilibria with their basins of attraction, plus three unstable integrated equilibria (a central
unstable node, flanked by two saddles). When u = 0.8, we see in figure 8b that the segregated equilibrium
at (X1, Y1) = (1, 0) is no longer accessible, being replaced by a (slightly) integrated stable equilibrium.
The three unstable integrated equilibria still survive. A further decrease to u = 0.71 produces two extra
equilibria (figure 8c). One of these is a stable highly integrated equilibrium, but it has a small basin of
attraction, shown in white to the left of the line X1 = 0.71. This equilibrium only exists for u ∈ [Xa1, X+1 ].
When u = 0.6 (figure 8d), we see that we have lost two equilbria, leaving us with just two equilibria on the
line X1 = 0.6, with only the lower one being stable. Subsequent reduction to u = 0.4 leads to a loss of a
further two equilibria (figure 8e). Finally when u = 0.29, we lose yet another pair of equilibria, leaving only
the stable equilibrium at (X1, Y1) = (0, 1α).
In our second case, we take (α, β) = (7, 49), so we are in the dark shaded region of figure 3. Now we
have 9 equilibria, two of which correspond to stable integration. The effect of restricting the X1-population
is shown in figure 9, for u = 1, 0.89, 0.75, 0.25, 0.11, 0.09.
Hence it can be seen that in the two neighbourhood case, restriction of population does not always lead
to new integrated equilibria, and those that are produced may only have small basins of attraction. Of
possible greater concern is that population restriction can also eliminate integration.
(a) u = 1 (b) u = 0.8
(c) u = 0.71 (d) u = 0.6
(e) u = 0.4 (f) u = 0.29
Figure 8: Limiting the X1 population: (α, β) = (6, 30). Stable equilibria are denoted by  , unstable nodes by # and saddle points
by ⊗.
4 Nonlinear tolerance schedules
In this section, we consider other ways in which the linear tolerance schedule can be modified to produce
integrated populations. We illustrate phenomena that can occur when the tolerance schedules are nonlinear,
using the original equations (1) in their unscaled form, without restricting the population. We focus on the
(a) u = 1 (b) u = 0.89
(c) u = 0.75 (d) u = 0.25
(e) u = 0.11 (f) u = 0.09
Figure 9: Limiting the X1 population: (α, β) = (7, 49). Stable equilibria are denoted by  , unstable nodes by # and saddle points
by ⊗.
case a = 2, b = 10, k = 1, that is (α, β) = (2, 20). This is the simplest case when the tolerance schedules are
linear, corresponding to dynamics in the white region of figure 3, where we have two stable segregated
equilibria and one unstable integrated equilibria.
In our first example, let us replace the linear X1-population tolerance schedule (2) with an exponential
tolerance schedule [5], of the form
RX1(X1) =RE4X1(X1) ≡ 21− e−4 [e−4X1 − e−4] , (59)
where RE4X1(0) = 2, RE4X1(1) = 0. The Y1-population has the linear tolerance schedule RY1(Y1) ≡ 10(1−Y1).
The results shown in figure 10a are similar to the linear case.
Keeping RX1(X1) = RE4X1(X1), we now replace the linear tolerance schedule of the Y1-population with
an exponential tolerance schedule of the form
RY1(Y1) =RE4Y1(Y1) ≡ 101− e−4 [e−4Y1 − e−4] , (60)
where RE4Y1(0) = 10, RE4Y1(1) = 0. In this case, the central fixed point - a fully integrated population in both
neighbourhoods - is now stable, with a large basin of attraction (figure 10b). However, near the saddle
points, a small change in initial conditions can lead to a stable segregated population.
Next, consider polynomial tolerance schedules [5], of the form
RX1(X1) =RQpX1(X1) ≡ a(1−X1)p (61)
RY1(Y1) =RQpY1(Y1) ≡ b(1− kY1)p, (62)
where p ∈ Z+ and a = 2, b = 10, k = 1, that is (α, β) = (2, 20), as before. When p = 1, we have the linear
tolerance schedule case. When p = 2, the corresponding nullcline is a straight line in (X1, Y1) phase space.
In figure 10c, we set RX1 = RQ2X1 , given by (61) and RY1(Y1) = 10(1−Y1), that is, p = 2 for X1 and p = 1 for Y1.
The results are similar to both the linear case and to figure 10a. However when we set we set RX1 = RQ2X1 ,
and RY1 = RQ2Y1 , we have an open set of equilibria, given by the line αY1 = 1−X1, shown in figure 10d. Any
desired population mixture can be obtained simply by the correct choice of initial conditions. However it is
clear that this outcome is not robust - any small change in p will lead to a different outcome.
Finally, in figure 10e, we set RX1 = RQ3X1 , and RY1(Y1) = 10(1−Y1). The results are similar to both the
linear case and to figures 10a and 10c. However when we set we set RX1 = RQ3X1 , and RY1 = RQ3Y1 , the
central fixed point is stable and its basin of attraction covers the whole of phase space, shown in figure 10f.
RQ3X and RQ
3
Y represent globally less tolerant populations than the equivalent linear cases. We can
interpret the stable fixed point in figure 10f phenomenon as follows: low tolerance constraints mean that
both types are trying to leave both neighbourhoods simultaneously. The stable equilibrium therefore
represents a best case scenario, rather than a state in which all tolerance demands are satisfied.
So overall we can conclude that modification of the linear tolerance schedule of only one population
may not be enough to induce integration. Instead, both populations may need to modify their tolerance
schedules to become integrated.
5 Discussion
Schelling [14] states that “. . . [in the BNM] . . . an important phenomenon can be that a too-tolerant majority
can overwhelm a minority and bring about segregation". We have that
β
b
= a = α
k
.
So β = bkα. Hence lines through the origin of (α, β) parameter space correspond to increasing a, the
upper tolerance limit of the majority X-population. We show two of these lines in Figure 7, for bk = 2, 8
corresponding to the case when middle branch of nullcline (19) both exists and lies wholly within the
allowed phase space. As we can see, asymptotic to that range is the area of existence of stable integration.
Outside that range, even if a is very big, we can not get stable integration, thus quantifying Schelling’s [14]
statement.
(a) RX1 = RE4X1 ; RY1 = 10(1−Y1). (b) RX1 = RE4X1 ; RY1 = RE4Y1 .
(c) RX1 = RQ2X1 ; RY1 = 10(1−Y1). (d) RX1 = RQ2X1 ; RY1 = RQ2Y1 .
(e) RX1 = RQ3X1 ; RY1 = 10(1−Y1). (f) RX1 = RQ3X1 ; RY1 = RQ3Y1 .
Figure 10: Nullclines, fixed points and basins of attraction for some candidate nonlinear tolerance schedules. Stable equilibria are
denoted by  , unstable nodes by # and saddle points by ⊗.
So far, we have only considered equilibria of our governing Schelling dynamical system (10). Do these
equations have periodic solutions? They have been observed in discrete time “two rooms" models of
segregation. But these oscillations appear to be neutrally stable and consist of population swings in both
rooms. Periodic solutions have also been observed [3, 7] in Lotka-Volterra predator-prey models in two
habitats (or patches). But there the dynamics is substantially different.
In our case, we have not found any Hopf bifurcations in our calculations and extensive numerical
simulations have not produced any limit cycles. So if they exist, they are most likely unstable (or have a
very small basin of attraction). Since (10) is a planar system, Dulac’s criterion [8] could be used to show
that (10) does not have limit cycles. But up to now, we have been unable to find the correct Dulac function.
So the existence and stability of periodic solutions to (10) must remain an open question.
We can use our results to consider the effects of variation in parameters α and β. In particular we
are interested in what might happen as the minority Y-population grows. Provided the variation is slow
enough to be considered quasi-static, we can simply move around parameter space. A key parameter is
α ≡ ak. If we fix a, the maximum tolerance of the X-population, and then decrease k, the Y-population
grows as α decreases. Then for fixed combined tolerance parameter β ≡ ab > 36 in figure 3, we see that
integration is only a transient phase as we enter and then leave the dark shaded region. So as k decreases,
we need to ensure that α stays fixed, and that can only happen if a increases. In other words, when a
minority grows, stable integration is only possible if the majority population increases its own tolerance
as well. This runs counter to the populist idea that a growing minority should integrate more into the
majority to be accepted.
In [5], we considered the case where the two populations could live either in one neighbourhood or
remove themselves to a place “where colour does not matter" [13]. Suppose now that this place changes in
such a way that colour does matter. This could happen for example by the creation or removal of borders
or as the result of a change in government. If there is an integrated population in the single neighbourhood,
will it remain integrated after the change to two neighbourhoods?
If we overlay part of figure 3 with part of figure 2 of [5], we obtain figure 11. We can now make the
following observation: in the light shaded region of figure 11 with apex P1, a single neighbourhood can
have a stable, integrated population. But, for the two neighbourhood case, a stable integrated population is
possible only in the dark shaded region with apex P2.
We then arrive at the remarkable conclusion that, if the minority population is such that its values of
α, β lie in the light shaded region, a re-organisation of neighbourhoods can lead to the loss of the stable
integrated population, without any change in the numbers or attitudes of either population. Put another
way, some types of minority population in two neighbourhoods can only achieve integration by creating
one neighbourhood and a place where type does not matter, or after a perturbation of the system (tipping)
into the basin of attraction of an integrated equilibrium.
The two curves shown in figure 11 appear similar. In fact, a simple mapping takes one curve
into the other. Apex P2 has coordinates (α, β) = (6, 36), whereas at apex P1, (α, β) = (3, 9). If we set(α, β)2−neighbourhood = (2α, 4β)1−neighbourhood in (30), then we recover equation (9) of [5]. These equations give
curves in parameter space where the discriminant of cubic is zero. But it can be shown that the cubic
equations from which they originate are completely different and that the governing dynamical systems
cannot be mapped to one another.
We can extend the two-neighbourhood problem, by introducing an option to be in neither neighbourhood
(figure 12). Let X3 and Y3 denote the X- and Y-populations present in neither neighbourhood. These
reservoirs are segregated. Thus X3 = 1−X1 −X2 and Y3 = 1α −Y1 −Y2. Neighbourhoods 1 and 2 are occupied
upon demand as follows. People enter a neighbourhood when the tolerance in that neighbourhood means
that they would stay (and of course people leave a neighbourhood when the tolerance there means they
should leave). To move between neighbourhoods, population members must go through either X3 or Y3 (in
this version of the problem, there is no direct movement between neighbourhoods 1 and 2).
If f1(Xi, Yi) = Xi(XiRXi(Xi)−Yi), i = 1, 2 and g1(Xi, Yi) = Yi(YiRYi(Yi)−Yi), i = 1, 2, then
dX1
dt
= ⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩ f1(X1, Y1) f1(X1, Y1) ≤ 0 OR X3 > 0max(0,− f2) f1(X1, Y1) > 0 AND X3 = 0 (63)
dY1
dt
= ⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩g1(X1, Y1) g1(X1, Y1) ≤ 0 OR Y3 > 0max(0,−g2) g1(X1, Y1) > 0 AND Y3 = 0, (64)
which is equivalent to the single-neighbourhood case with limiting numbers and u = X1 +X3, v = Y1 +Y3.
Figure 11: Comparison of integrated population parameters for two-neighbourhoods with the single-neighbourhood problem [5].
Curves with apex P1 = (3, 9) are β = β± from [5]. Curves with apex P2 = (6, 36) are β = β± from (31) above.
neighbourhood 1 (X1, Y1) neighbourhood 2 (X2, Y2)
X3
Y3
−X˙1
X˙1
−Y˙1
Y˙1
−X˙2
X˙2
−Y˙2
Y˙2
Figure 12: Dynamics of the two neighbourhoods problem with reservoirs of population. All arrows represent population flow
when the corresponding quantities are positive. Dotted arrows have the additional constraint that X3 > 0 (top part of
schematic) or Y3 > 0 (bottom part of schematic).
We summarise the dynamics in table 1.
Figure 13 shows the results of simulating this system. For each (α, β), we simulate 20 randomly selected
initial conditions, and compute the index of dissimilarity D at equilibrium. The conventional definition of
dissimilarity [9] is D ∶= 12 [∣X1 − αY1∣+ ∣X2 − αY2∣] ∈ [0, 1], and corresponds to the proportion of the minority
population that would have to relocate in order to yield a uniform distribution of both types across all
neighbourhoods. One typical criticism of the index of dissimilarity is its sensitivity to neighbourhood
boundaries. Since boundaries are an inherent property of any BNM, this index is a natural tool to employ
in our study.
Our colour scale for basins of attraction in cases I-IV uses the modified measure D¯ ∶= X1 − αY1 ∈ [−1, 1]
applied to the corresponding stable equilibrium, in order to distinguish between X1- and Y1-dominance. A
white basin of attraction denotes an even distribution of types in both neighbourhoods. In figure 13, we
return to the conventional D ∈ [0, 1] as this yields a single measure for the whole system, rather than just
X3 > 0 X3 = 0 Y3 > 0 Y3 = 0
f1 ≤ 0 f1 f1 g1 ≤ 0 g1 g1
f1 > 0 f1 0 g1 > 0 g1 0
f2 ≤ 0 f2 f2 g2 ≤ 0 g2 g2
f2 > 0 f2 0 g2 > 0 g2 0
Table 1: Summary of dynamics for two neighbourhoods with population reservoirs, given in (63) and (64). First two columns:
dX1
dt . Second two columns:
dY1
dt .
one neighbourhoods.
We repeat this procedure for systems with two neighbourhoods without conservation of population,
namely two decoupled, single-neighbourhood models, as in [5]. In the former case, the constraint imposed
by conservation typically results in stable integrated states. In the latter case, the colour scale clearly shows
the relative area of basin of attraction of stable segregated states (D = 1), weighted by dissimilarity of the
stable integrated states.
6 Conclusion
We have considered Schelling’s BNM for the case of two neighbourhoods, with and without population
reservoirs. In the latter case, we presented the governing dynamical systems in (5) and (6). For the case of
identical (X, Y) linear tolerance schedules (case I), we have carried out an extensive analysis, showing both
the existence and stability of integration. We have shown that such an outcome requires a small minority,
in the presence of a highly tolerant majority. Similar results were obtained when the linear tolerances differ
between neighbourhoods (cases II, III, IV).
If one or the other population is restricted, by removing the most intolerant individuals, we have shown
that new stable population mixtures can be created. But they may only exist in narrow regions of parameter
space, with small basins of attraction. In some cases, existing stable integrated populations can even be
destroyed by this process. We also considered how different nonlinear tolerance schedules can affect our
results.
Our results shed light on some popular notions of integration. So if a minority grows slowly, existing
stable integration will be destroyed unless the majority population becomes more tolerant (and yet they
may feel less tolerant as a result of the increase in the minority). Any increase in tolerance by the minority
will have little effect.
Similarly the transition from one neighbourhood to two neighbourhoods (or vice versa) is not necessarily
straightforward. A well-integrated single neighbourhood can become segregated after such a transition,
without any change in the tolerance of either population.
Finally, when considering the case of 2 neighbourhoods connected by population reserves, we see
that integrated stable states exist for low values of tolerance parameters as a result of competition for
finite resources. The notion of trade-off between tolerance demands and external constraints, namely
neighbourhood structures and finite population reserves, is crucial to understanding the dynamics of
segregation. We invite readers from socio-economic disciplines to offer insight into interpretation of our
results, and to aid the construction of more complex model variants that better describe the flows of
population in real urban areas.
(a) Two-neighbourhood model with reservoirs. (b) 2 independent single neighbourhood models without conser-
vation of population.
(c) Example trajectories (two-neighbourhood model). (d) Example trajectories (single neighbourhood models).
Figure 13: For each (α, β), we simulated 20 sets of initial conditions for t = 0 to t = 200, calculated dissimilarity D for each and
plotted the mean D in parameter space (D = 1 indicates complete segregation, D = 0 indicates an even distribution
between neighbourhoods). Note that two empty neighbourhoods yields D = 0. Results for two neighbourhoods with
reservoirs are shown in (a), and two independent simulations without conservation of total population are shown in (b).
Example trajectories from (a) and (b) are given in (c) and (d) respectively, with α = 6, β = 30, X1(0) = 0.1, X2(0) =
0.11, Y1(0) = 0.09, Y2(0) = 0.11.
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